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A Public Role for the Intentional Torts
Dan Priel*

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen wide-ranging debates on the nature of tort law. For some, tort law is
firmly placed within private law: it is concerned with the rights individuals have against each
other and with the legal implications of the violation of those rights. Others emphasise
the extent to which broad social considerations enter into the determination of tort liability
and the many ways in which tort law today serves a public role that is illexplained by the
private law model. Given the centrality of negligence in contemporary tort law, much of
this debate focused on this tort, but recent litigation that culminated in the House of Lords’
decision in Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police1 and some academic commentary
relating to it provide an opportunity for examining these questions in the context of the
intentional torts.
Though it will be some time before I get to discuss Ashley, it will be useful to describe its
facts right away. The police had gathered information that James Ashley was involved in
illegal activities including drug dealing. They obtained a warrant to search his house and
decided to raid it in the middle of the night. When a police unit entered the house, Ashley
got up from his bed and walked towards the police officers with his hands pointing towards
them as though holding a gun. One of the police officers, PC Sherwood, fired a single shot

that hit Ashley in the neck. Ashley was severely wounded, and despite the police
officers’ attempts at resuscitation and the prompt arrival of an ambulance, in less than an
hour Ashley was pronounced dead. Ashley’s dependants sued the police for negligence
and trespass to the person with regard to the actions that led to his death, as well as for
misfeasance in public office with regard to certain events that took place after the shooting.
As the police admitted negligence they argued that there would be no point in a trial on the
trespass claim. The trial court accepted the argument, but the Court of Appeal (Auld LJ
dissenting) reversed and the House of Lords, against the dissenting opinions of Lords
Carswell and Neuberger, upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision.
This outcome, coupled with the fact that some of the judges invoked the notion of
‘vindication of rights’, a shibboleth for proponents of the private conception of tort law,
has led most commentary on the case to consider it an affirmation of this view of tort
law.2 One purpose of this essay is to show that this is, at best, an incomplete account of the
judges’ views expressed in the case. My real concern, however, is broader. With the aid of this
case I seek to challenge the private law conception of tort liability exactly in the context of
those torts usually thought to be the best affirmation of this conception of tort law.3
My discussion therefore begins far from the intentional torts. I consider some of the
important developments that have changed the face of negligence liability in the last few
decades and argue that, though very different, they all have in common the introduction
into the decision on tort liability of considerations that look beyond the litigants. The
next question is whether a similar trend can be identified with regard to the intentional
torts. I argue that we can identify a role for the intentional torts within a tort regime
dominated by the tort of negligence, a role that has much more to do with broad societal (or
public) considerations than with those confined to the individual parties involved. More

concretely, in sections II and III I distinguish between three possible interpretations of
vindication of rights, two consistent with the private law view of tort law and the third one
that is not. I argue that the two private law interpretations of vindication are
unsuccessful, but that the third one provides a limited but potentially useful role for the
intentional torts. As it happens, it is this, more public conception of vindication that was
explicitly adopted by some of the judges in Ashley, and which, I contend, provides the
best justification for the decision.

I. HOW TORT LAW BECAME PUBLIC

Given the age and centrality of tort law, one would be forgiven for thinking that its basic
principles should be settled by now; but as many have noticed and some have lamented it
is constantly changing. At first blush it seems that changes have mostly been in the
direction of limiting liability, with the House of Lords using everything at its disposal to
achieve this goal: distinguishing new cases from earlier ones on flimsy grounds,4 making
unsubstantiated claims about the effects of expanding liability,5 limiting past decisions by
declaring them ‘acceptable on [their] own facts’,6 narrowly interpreting the elements of
existing torts,7 and rewriting past decisions so as to effectively overrule them without
saying so.8 When all else has failed, the judges have not shied away from explicitly
overruling an earlier decision in order to limit the scope of tort liability.9
These changes, significant though they are, appear from a broader perspective to be a
rearguard battle against an ever-expanding tort law. There are various reasons for this, of
which only a small number can be addressed here. One reason for the changes has to do

with the substantial increase in the prevalence of accidents after the industrial
revolution. That tort law now primarily deals with accidents not only explains why
negligence is much more important than it used to be; it also changed the foundations of
tort law. Two main features are worth highlighting: first, with industrialisation it became
commonplace that momentary inadvertence could lead to serious accidents, which made it
difficult to associate tort liability with moral fault; relatedly, industrialisation also
weakened the connection between the degree of fault and the amount of harm caused
(and hence damages award). Although the language of ‘fault’ has been retained, these
developments meant that tort liability (especially in negligence) no longer corresponded
well to perceptions of moral fault. Ideas such as loss spreading and general deterrence
began to appear in both academic work and judicial opinions in its place, and these have
led to the introduction of broader social considerations into the decision whether tort
liability should be imposed or not. From this it was but a small step to the view that tort
law could serve as a regulatory device and to the extent necessary should be refashioned
accordingly.
The untying of fault from liability and the emergence of new bases for the imposition of
tort liability also affected the legitimacy of insurance in the context of tort liability. In the
nineteenth century, liability (third party) insurance was still considered morally and legally
suspect due to its potential to relieve defendants of their legal liabilities, and by

implication their moral responsibilities.10 Once the connection between liability and fault
was severed, it became easier to accept insurance against liability. (Today, let us not forget,
liability insurance is often required by law.) And once liability insurance was widely
available, judges openly stated that this was a relevant factor in deciding whether tort

liability should be imposed.
Other factors affected tort liability in a more indirect way. Since the eighteenth
century, new mathematical tools and new technologies have been developed to gather
and analyse vast amounts of information. This intellectual development, which Ian
Hacking called the ‘emergence of probability’,11 has transformed the way people perceive
the world. If beforehand events were considered in isolation, the result of a single causal
path, the advent of statistics and probability meant that particular events were increasingly
considered in terms of their place within wider trends. The effect of this has been to turn
individual instances of death, disease, crime or accident into social problems, requiring
some kind of comprehensive response, which many felt only the government could
provide. The availability of statistics affected tort law in another indirect way: it meant that
even without physical harm, statistical data could affect the value of property, a person’s
prospects of employability and so on. These new kinds of loss encouraged the
development of new doctrines or the updating of old ones.
Alongside these scientific developments there were also political changes that affected
tort law. Of the greatest importance is the advent of the modern welfare state and its
enormous growth. The welfare state took it upon itself to inspect and regulate many
aspects of people’s lives, especially in the areas of physical and economic health and
security. In New Zealand such ideas have resulted in the adoption of a social insurance
scheme against accidents. In other countries their greatest impact has been to expand the
tort liability of public authorities. In other contexts the expansion of welfare provisions
meant that tort rules now existed within a different normative environment. Finally, the
growing prominence of human rights discourse, including the more controversial social
and economic rights, has had a profound impact on the normative background against

which tort law operates, which in various contexts has broadened the scope of
considerations taken into account in determining tort liability.12
There are many other factors that have led to expansion in tort liability, but I focus on
the ones singled out here because not only do they explain the expansionary trends in tort
liability, they also undermine the view that the resolution of a tort dispute can be
limited only to factors that pertain only to the litigants: statistical information is inevitably
based on a large number of events; insurance pools together many different individuals;
deterrence seeks to use tort litigation to change the behaviour of others; the social costs of
accidents are a public concern; human rights and the welfare state are topics that belong to
public law and policy. When taken together it is not difficult to understand why tort law
today is so different from what it was 150 years ago, and how misleading it is to think of it as
a strictly ‘private’ law affair.
As already mentioned, these trends have not been uniformly welcomed, and in recent
years several judges and academic commentators have called for a return to a more
‘traditional’ understanding of tort law.13 Though many of them have couched their
arguments in terms of the nature of tort law, these authors have had to concede that it is
possible to have a different kind of tort law from the kind they favour. Thus, despite
appearances they have ended up defending their view by appealing to normative
considerations such as separation of powers or the institutional capacity of courts. Quite
often these writings have also conveyed a thinly veiled political ideology.14 The result is
that much of tort law has begun to look ‘public’ in at least two senses: as a matter of fact,
decisions on the scope of tort liability are affected by a myriad of factors not confined to
the parties involved in litigation, and as a matter of normative theory, questions of the
scope of liability are the subject of competing political theories.

All these developments, however, do not appear to have had much impact on the
intentional torts dealing with harms to the person and to property.15 These torts, it seems,
have continued to exist as relics from a very different past, a shrinking and little loved
island of private law in constant danger of being completely submerged under the rising
seas of the more openly public negligence law.16 Indeed, it may be that it is exactly because
they were perceived as uniquely ‘private’ that these torts were thought incapable of
adapting to novel situations and were therefore left behind. Because of the sorts of events
they traditionally covered they were not subject to the kind of evolutionary pressures that led
to the doctrinal innovations which enabled negligence to become a versatile tool for
dealing with a wide range of new types of situation. Consequently, even issues like
patients’ consent to medical treatment, which might have been more ‘naturally’ dealt
with under the heading of battery, ended up being treated as cases of negligence.17

II. THREE UNSUCCESSFUL ROLES FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORTS

All of this raises the question, What role should the intentional torts play within today’s tort
law regime? If for all practical purposes all cases of trespass can also be claimed under
negligence, then, despite their unquestionably separate history, we would have to conclude
that the intentional torts are now redundant and should be abandoned. Some may have
linguistic qualms about intentional actions being treated as cases of ‘negligence’,18 but this
should not be a matter of grave concern. If necessary, we could rename negligence as
‘unlawful infliction of harm’ and thus resolve this problem. But before we move to do so we
should examine whether there is no way of understanding the intentional torts that does

not subsume them under negligence. I will consider three possible interpretations. Common
to all of them is the fact that they aim to locate the unique features of the intentional
torts within the narrow ‘private’ law relationship between claimant and defendant. I
will argue that for different reasons none of them is satisfactory.

A. Intention as a Special Mental State
According to one possible interpretation, what justifies separating the intentional torts
from negligence is that intention is a unique mental state that cannot be equated with or
reduced to mere prediction or indifference (let alone the lack of mental state that is often the
mark of negligence), and therefore deserves special treatment by the law. In this sense what
distinguishes actions done ‘with intention’ is that they involve a clear choice on the part of
the agent.19 John Finnis, who defended the moral significance of this distinction, has
argued that the difference is the result of the

impact of choosing and intending upon the character of the chooser … [because] choices last. The
proposal which one adopts by choice in forming an intention, together with the reasoning which
in one’s deliberation made that proposal intelligently attractive, remains, persists, in one’s
will … The proposal (and thus the intention) is, so to speak, synthesized into one’s will,

one’s practical orientation and stance in the world. … Whatever consequences lie outside one’s
proposal, because neither wanted for their own sake nor needed as a means, are not synthesized into
one’s will.20

Though couched in somewhat mysterious terms, Finnis’s point seems clear enough and

corresponds with widely shared views. The intended outcomes of one’s actions are what
one strives for, and as such they are properly described as ‘owned by’ or ‘belonging to’ the
agent. They are so much a part of the agent’s identity that as far as blame goes we often
care little whether the intended outcome materialised or not. Unintended consequences, on
the other hand, do not usually reflect on one’s personality in such a way. The difference
between acts of intention and the outcomes of negligence is considered so fundamental that
it is not surprising that even in jurisdictions where liability for (some types of)
accidents is strict or absolute, there is typically an exception for the intentional infliction of
harm.
There is a straightforward argument that could support maintaining this distinction in
tort law: if we accept the assumption that, other things being equal, acts done with intent
to cause harm are more morally heinous or more dangerous (because they are more
likely to cause harm) than those that are not, then a heightened mental element could be
offset by lowered requirements in the physical elements of the tort. In this way we could
capture certain undesirable behaviours that would otherwise escape tort liability. There are
traces of this approach in the law: first, the concept of duty of care, which serves as a filtering
mechanism for limiting liability for negligence, has no equivalent in intentional torts
dealing with similar harm: compare the requirement for a ‘special relationship’ in
the case of negligent misrepresentation with the lack of such a requirement in the tort of
deceit. Second, in the case of intended outcomes there is a narrower scope for doctrines
like novus actus interveniens, because, as the saying goes, intended consequences can
never be too remote.21 And third, the limits on recovery for pure economic loss and pure
mental injury are much narrower in the case of torts of intention;22 in fact, certain
intentional torts, such as deceit or inducing breach of contract, deal almost exclusively with

pure economic losses,23 whereas similar actions committed without intention often do not
give rise to tort liability at all.
This could be a coherent and plausible basis for distinguishing between intentional
torts and negligence. It received its clearest endorsement in English law in Letang v Cooper,
where Lord Denning drew a distinction between negligence and trespass based on their
mental element. As he put it, a claimant must show that he has been harmed either
‘intentionally or negligently. If intentional, it is the tort of assault and battery. If negligent
and causing damage, it is the tort of negligence.’24 However, as in many other instances,
Lord Denning’s view found few supporters. Already in Letang Diplock LJ favoured the
view that trespass is not limited to actions committed with an intention to cause harm,25 and
subsequent cases followed his view. Perhaps it is the expansion of negligence and the decline
of the doctrine of privity in contract that has made the need to define the intentional
torts in this way seem less pressing.

B. The Intentional Torts as Strict Liability Torts
We can identify a second way of distinguishing between negligence and the intentional
torts, which, perhaps paradoxically, takes a diametrically opposed approach. Contrary to the
approach that sought to locate the distinction in a heightened mens rea requirement for the
intentional torts, the second interpretation distinguishes the intentional torts by having a
lower mental requirement. On this view the difference between negligence and the
intentional torts might be characterised in the following way: while the net of
negligence is cast very wide to cover a broad range of potential kinds of interaction
between individuals, the scope of liability is limited by the need to show negligence on the

part of the injurer; by contrast, the intentional torts are considerably narrower in the
sorts of events they cover, but require a less demanding mental element.
A linguistic basis for such an interpretation of the intentional torts might be based on the
distinction between acts done ‘intentionally’ and those done ‘with intent (to bring about
a certain outcome)’. If I hit someone while driving, the actions involved in my driving
that lead to the accident (turning the steering wheel, pressing on the accelerator) are
intentional even though I may have no intention of harming anyone. The former is, to use
John Searle’s terms, an example of ‘intention in action’ while the latter is a case of ‘prior
intention’.26
A rather strict version of this distinction may be gleaned from several seventeenth
century cases of trespass. Two cases of trespass to land maintained that a person commits
the tort even when his entry onto another’s land is the result of a reasonable mistake,27 but
that a person is not liable if his entry onto another’s land was involuntary.28 Similarly, in the
context of trespass to the person one case held that one who directly harmed another could
not escape liability ‘except it may be adjudged utterly without his fault. As if a man by force
take my hand and strike you …’29 Though couched in the language of fault, the example
suggests that only lack of voluntariness would have exempted the defendant. A more recent
case that may reflect a somewhat similar view is Wilson v Pringle, where the court said that
it is ‘the act and not the injury which must be intentional. An intention to injure is not
essential to an action for trespass to the person. It is the mere trespass by itself which is
the offence.’30 On this view even an instinctive reaction may be intentional. The difficulty
with this approach, however, is maintaining a viable distinction between trespass to the
person and a rather broad tort of negligence (at least where physical harm is
concerned). Ashley provides a useful illustration. Both the Court of Appeal and the

House of Lords had to consider the scope of self-defence where a person mistakenly
believes he is being attacked. The courts considered three possible rules: (1) one is entitled
to defend oneself so long as one’s actions are based on a genuine (even if unreasonable)
belief that one is under attack; (2) the defendant is entitled to the defence so long as his
mistaken belief is reasonable; (3) the defence is limited to cases of actual
attack (and the defence is denied altogether in cases of mistake).
In both courts the unanimously adopted rule was the second one,31 although some of
the Law Lords made some obiter remarks which were sympathetic to the third rule.32 Had
this alternative rule been adopted, trespass to the person could have been defended as a
strict liability tort, for even in those instances in which one was in no way to blame for
attacking someone else, one would sometimes commit battery.33
The distinction matters in those cases in which both sides are innocent but one
person’s actions cause harm to another. In negligence the loss in such cases remains
uncompensated, whereas in strict liability torts the loss is shifted to the defendant. The
rule on self-defence adopted in the Court of Appeal and left unchallenged in the House of
Lords was that a reasonable mistake about being attacked would still excuse one in
attacking others. This introduces into the tort those flexible elements that have made
negligence such fertile ground for development and expansion, but this result is achieved by
blurring the distinction between trespass and negligence.
Despite the fact that introducing a standard of reasonableness into the tort of trespass
creates this possibility, there was no serious attempt to justify the choice of rule. All we are
told is that the rule is justified by the different aims of criminal law and tort law: while
criminal law is concerned with protecting against behaviour that is ‘damaging to the good
order of society’, tort law is concerned with ‘protecting the rights that every person is

entitled to assert against … others’.34 In a moment I will deal with the suggestion that tort
law is concerned with the protection of rights, but even if one accepts this view, it is not
clear that this calls for a different ‘balance’ in tort law and criminal law. On the one hand,
criminal defendants already enjoy procedural protections not given to their civil
counterparts, which may render different substantive rules undesirable. On the other
hand, as already mentioned, by adding the reasonableness requirement to a defence of
battery, the point of maintaining a distinct tort of trespass to the person becomes less
clear. In other words, the decision maintains a particular balance between tort law and
criminal law at the expense of undermining a different one within tort law. One may
think it desirable that for the sake of maintaining a distinction between criminal law and tort
law there should be tort liability even in some cases where there would not be
corresponding criminal liability; it does not follow that this liability should be in battery.
Thus, one effect of Ashley that has not received much attention is how a decision that
seemingly sought to maintain the contemporary relevance of battery did so by eroding the
distinction between battery and negligence.
However, from a broader perspective that takes the whole of tort law into view, this
result may have been entirely understandable and even justified: if the intentional torts
had been interpreted as strict liability torts, that would have meant that when both parties are
innocent the loss would be borne by the defendant; by contrast, in negligence in such cases
the claimant would normally lose. Given the ubiquity of interactions that could
potentially constitute trespass to the person (and, importantly, for which individuals
could not adequately insure themselves), it is understandable why the courts would seek to
narrow the scope of strict liability intentional torts. In order to achieve this end, many of
the traditional torts (including the intentional torts) have been undergoing a process

which makes them increasingly similar to negligence. In the case of battery, for example,
this was done by deciding that the tort does not cover ‘all physical conduct which is
generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life’.35 The decision in Ashley is just
another manifestation of the same trend. Once again, however, such trends force upon us
the question whether there is any unique role for the intentional torts.
In sum, while the strict liability interpretation of the intentional torts could provide a
plausible basis for a distinction between these torts and negligence, we see that the courts go
against it exactly because of the perception that the intentional torts are a blunt tool for
dealing with the many kinds of interactions that are part of everyday life. The result is that
this interpretation of the intentional torts is, like the first one, ultimately not likely to
succeed in maintaining a significant role for these torts.

C. Intentional Torts as the Foundation of Primary Rights
Perhaps, however, considering the question as one of finding normative space for the
intentional torts alongside negligence is the wrong approach to take. Perhaps the role the
intentional torts play within the legal system is altogether different. Adopting an expansive
view of the intentional torts (closer, that is, to the second interpretation considered above),
some writers have suggested that the role of the intentional torts is to ‘vindicate’ people’s
primary rights whose content is, roughly, that one is entitled to have control over one’s
body and property and to be free from interference with them. This view is usually
associated with the ‘private law’ approach to tort law.36
Several statements in Ashley indicate that the judges believe that vindication of rights is
one of the main purposes of tort law,37 and these statements may suggest that this is the true

reason for maintaining the intentional torts. In fact, however, the picture is more
complicated than it at first appears, because the notion of vindication is ambiguous; it can be
interpreted in several different ways, not all of which support the private law view. My
argument in this section is that two private law interpretations of the idea of vindication are
unconvincing, and that the best interpretation of the notion of vindication, at least as found
in Ashley, actually fits better a ‘public law’ conception of tort law.
The notion of vindication can be understood, first, as a ‘private’ power an individual
has to assert the existence of her rights against other individuals (including the state).
Alternatively, it may mean an individual’s power to make public the fact that her rights
(whose content is determined elsewhere) have been infringed. Importantly, in the former
sense the idea of vindication is understood as constitutive of certain relations between
individuals; in the latter, the vindicatory (as opposed to the compensatory) role of tort law is
in providing a public forum in which claims of infringement of rights are to be both
examined and, where a violation has been found, protected by the state. The former
interpretation is the one favoured by proponents of the private law view of tort law and
will be discussed in this subsection. The alternative, public law version of vindication will be
considered in the next section.
The private law notion of vindication is itself ambiguous between two possible
interpretations: abstract and concrete. Understood abstractly, tort law may be thought to
establish such rights as freedom of speech, bodily integrity, property, autonomy and so on.
Thus, for example, it has been suggested that ‘[t]respass vindicates the rights of property
owners to exclude others from their land [and b]attery describes the obligation owed by
all citizens to each other citizen not to beat, wound, or inappropriately touch another
intentionally and unjustifiably’. 38 Along those lines Donal Nolan has suggested that

negligence may be used to vindicate rights, such as the right to education.39
Do we need to use tort law for this purpose? Traditionally, the common law has not
protected primary rights by means of positive declaration,40 and so tort law has often
been the only means to infer ‘backwards’ the existence of certain primary rights from the
existence of legal responses to their violation. The fact that the intentional torts are per se
torts, and thus not subject to certain limits imposed on negligence claims, has often been
offered in support of the view that one of their roles is to constitute primary rights. Even
though the prospects of people bringing claims for violations of their primary rights
when they have not suffered harm are small, these torts serve as the legal placeholders for the
existence of those rights. They are ‘placeholders’ because the rights established
through them (say, private property or freedom of speech in the abstract) are separate
from the question of their protection in individual cases.
In this sense, English tort law has arguably not been a success story.41 A lack of (if
nothing else) the rhetorical force of a positive declaration of rights may be part of the
reason why English law is a relative latecomer in respect of many issues on which other
legal systems (including other common law systems) have gone much further. To be sure,
opinions may differ on the matter, and no doubt looking only at the law provides only a
partial explanation of what must be in part a product of the British political tradition. Be all
that as it may, reliance on the intentional torts, or for that matter on tort law more
generally, no longer seems necessary for the sake of vindication of rights in the abstract
sense, because the existence of these rights is by now well established in English law from
other sources. In fact, often these rights are so well established that it is doubtful whether
anyone asked to provide proof of their legal recognition would turn to the intentional
torts as evidence. Probably first among those are societal attitudes toward such matters,

which, though vague, seem rather firm with regard to many of those rights the intentional
torts are supposed to vindicate at the abstract level. Such societal attitudes are known to
have an impact on the political underpinning or, if you will, the ideology of a legal
system,42 and it is doubtful whether without such support legal recognition of these rights
would remain intact.
Even within the narrower bounds of more traditional legal materials there are ample
sources for the vindication of rights in the abstract sense, first among them criminal law.
True, criminal law gives individuals only a limited role in the proceedings and therefore
only a limited power to demand the vindication of their rights, but this does not affect the
abstract sense of vindication we are concerned with at the moment. So long as the
criminal law system functions reasonably well, individuals can point to, say, the many
crimes concerned with the protection of private property, bodily integrity, security and so
on as constitutive of their rights. Furthermore, as already pointed out, since very few
people would (and could afford to) sue in tort law just for the sake of vindication of their
rights, the practical difference between criminal law and tort law in this respect is rather
minor. So long as it is the symbolic vindication of abstract rights that we care about, then
criminal prohibitions seem just as capable of providing it, in some sense perhaps even
better than tort law. The developed distinction within criminal law between justifications and
excuses implies that in the case of a successful excuse the defendant will be exonerated from
criminal responsibility even though the legal system could still acknowledge that another
person’s rights have been infringed. Thus, to use Ashley as an example, there is no problem
in saying that Ashley’s rights have been infringed by PC Sherwood’s actions, even if the
latter’s actions are found to be excusable. Tort law, which lacks this distinction, fares worse
in this regard.

An additional source for the vindication of rights available since 2000 is the Human
Rights Act 1998. Together with the European Convention on Human Rights it provides an
additional source of positive declarations about many of the very rights the intentional torts
may be supposed to vindicate (as well as some rights whose recognition in English tort law
has been patchy at best).43
It might be countered that criminal law or the Convention cannot fulfil the role of tort
law, because they deal in the relations between individuals and the state, and not with the
rights and duties individuals have towards each other. But this is a mistake, which stems
from confusing the abstract and concrete senses of the idea of vindication of rights: in the
abstract sense it is rights like bodily integrity or freedom of speech that we seek to
vindicate. And in this sense criminal law and human rights declarations are sufficient.
Even if we think that murder or rape are public wrongs, when we consider what makes
them public wrongs, part of the answer is that they violate individuals’ rights. In the
context of the Convention there is by now a familiar body of law which establishes that
states’ obligation to ‘protect’ human rights imposes on the state positive obligations to
prevent violations of individuals’ rights by third parties. These obligations make sense
only if the Convention is a source of legal rights and duties of individuals against each
other.44
Here is another way of making this point: suppose tort law were to be abolished
completely and replaced by an extensive social insurance mechanism while leaving the rest of
the law intact. Would we say that our right to bodily integrity has been abolished? In the
abstract sense the answer is ‘obviously not’. In fact, such a change in the law may be
justified by showing that the new legal regime would better protect individuals’ rights.
Whether or not this is true is an empirical question, not a conceptual one.

If, despite all this, we believe that for whatever reason tort law is needed for the
vindication of rights in this abstract sense, then negligence could provide as good a source
within tort law for this purpose. Indeed, it is exactly the flexibility of negligence that allows it
to be expanded to cover all sorts of rights (such as the right to education that Nolan had in
mind) that would be very difficult to recognise through the intentional torts. Some have
suggested, however, that it is only the intentional torts that vindicate rights like bodily
integrity or autonomy, and they can do so exactly because the claimant does not need to
show harm or unreasonableness on behalf of the defendant. This, it is further argued,
shows just how important those rights are.45 Even here, however, the flexibility of
negligence enables courts to take into account the bodily integrity and autonomy of
individuals not only as potential victims, but also as potential injurers. Individuals’
autonomy might be undermined not just by physical intrusion by other individuals, but
also by overbroad legal limitations on their actions. Vindication of physical integrity
through a broad tort of trespass to the person could undermine people’s autonomy if
innocuous trifles that cause no harm could constitute a tort. As we have seen, such
consequences were avoided by incorporating elements of reasonableness into the
intentional torts.
So, in the abstract sense, the idea that tort law, or more specifically the intentional
torts, are required for the vindication of the existence of rights is unnecessary. Perhaps,
however, the rights vindicated should be understood differently, ie as establishing the
boundaries between activities that lead to tort liability and those that do not. In some
writings by defenders of the private law model of tort law we see the view that it is not
(just) broad and abstract rights like freedom of speech or bodily integrity that tort law is
concerned with. Rather, the rights in question take the form of the right not to suffer

psychiatric harm by means of negligently causing harm to oneself, or the right not to
suffer psychiatric harm by witnessing the immediate aftermath of physical harm suffered by
one’s spouse as a result of another’s negligence.46 At least in some of the instances in which
the courts have spoken of vindication of rights, it appears that it is this sense they had in
mind.47
On this view, my arguments so far have been wide of the mark, because they
misunderstand the role of tort law in vindicating rights. Tort law is required in this sense in
order to make concrete the boundaries of abstract rights, something that declaratory
documents cannot do precisely because of their generality. On this view there is no space
between the existence of a right in a concrete situation and its vindication by tort law,
and so at no point in the process does tort law vindicate any rights whose existence is
determined elsewhere.48 Put differently, in the abstract sense the relationship between
tort law and vindication is justificatory; the existence of a right (not itself ‘established’ by
tort law) gives reason to vindicate it through tort law. In the concrete sense, the relation is
conceptual. Whenever tort liability is imposed, this means that a right has been violated;
whenever tort liability is not imposed, this means that a right has not been violated.
The main difficulty with vindication in the concrete sense is that to say that tort law
vindicates rights is to state a tautology.49 In this sense the view that tort law vindicates
rights is thus trivially true, but in this sense it cannot carve out any distinct conception of
tort law. All accounts of tort law, including those thought to be opposed to the private
conception of tort law (such as economic interpretations of tort law), are consistent with it.
Any liability whatsoever can be phrased as liability for a violated right. For example, by
itself this view is consistent with the view that we have a right not to suffer loss at the
hands of another, a right not to suffer loss when the costs of eliminating it are lower than

the expected loss itself, a right not be humiliated in public, or a right to be rescued by
others when in danger. This is because in the concrete sense the notion of vindication is by
definition devoid of any justificatory force.

III. A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORTS

Had we only considered the idea of vindication of rights in these senses, we would have
had good reason to doubt the point of retaining the intentional tort of trespass to the
person, and a fortiori the outcome of Ashley.50 This would not necessarily have meant
that an injurer’s state of mind had no role to play in tort law. We could still maintain the
normative significance of the distinction between intentional and careless acts, and proof of
intention could still play a role, for example, in the determination of damages (an
approach largely unrecognised in English tort law, but more common in other
jurisdictions). This, however, would hardly provide a reason for retaining separate intentional
torts. First, under no account do the cases that justify punitive damages track accurately the
distinction between intentional torts and negligence: there are many instances of
intentional torts which would not call for such damages; and there may be—at least on
some justifications of punitive damages—good reasons to award them in some cases of
negligence.51 Second, even if we thought that proof of intention were a relevant factor in
deciding whether to award punitive damages, this would not require separating
intentional torts from negligence. Proof of intention to cause harm could then be treated as
an aggravating factor, relevant, necessary or sufficient (as the case may be), within other torts.
Is there nonetheless a way of understanding what was decided in Ashley? I think there is,

but it calls for a different interpretation of the decision in both the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords, one based on some elements in those judgments that have been
neglected in previous commentary on the case. On this view one of the points of
contention in the case, and one that cuts across the majority-dissent lines in both courts,
deals with the potential public role of tort law and of the intentional torts in particular.
This view is consistent with something like the idea of vindication of rights appearing in the
decision, although only if understood differently from the more familiar ‘private law’
interpretation. In this sense vindication of a right is not synonymous with recognition of
certain legal relations between individuals. Rather, vindication is understood as a
particular aim of tort law (or perhaps more specifically tort litigation), and it is to provide a
public and impartial public forum for declaring that a claimant’s rights (whose legal
origin must be established on other grounds) have been infringed.52
Understood in this way, vindication may not seem at first particularly novel or
exciting. Arguably, this has been the role of courts from their earliest days. Vindication
through tort law in this sense is public in that it requires the existence of a public body
funded by the state for its existence, but that seems true of all tort cases. Moreover, since it
is legal rights we are concerned with, this view is, once again, consistent with any
substantive theory of what the content of those rights should be.
In this sense, then, the public sense of vindication seems not much more illuminating
than the private one. Even in this sense, I think it tells us something important, namely
that the idea of ‘private law’ is in some sense incoherent so long as state institutions (be
they the legislature or the courts) are involved in both the promulgation of rights and
their protection. However, it would be a mistake—indeed, a very similar mistake to the
one committed by proponents of the private law view—to think that something follows

from it regarding what the content of tort law should be.
If that is the case, we are again faced with a puzzle: the courts in Ashley did let the
claim in trespass to the person proceed to trial, and they relied on the notion of
vindication in reaching this conclusion. What did they mean by that? I want to suggest that
at least some of the judges involved in this case used the language of ‘vindication’ in a
distinct sense, quite different from its interpretations considered so far. For them the
decision to allow the claim in trespass to the person to proceed to trial was based on their
wish that potential misconduct by public authorities be investigated and pronounced
upon in a public forum. Thus, in this sense the vindication in question was ‘public’ not
merely in the sense that all law is in some sense public, but in the sense that they were
willing to take into account the concerns of the general public not involved in the case in
the context of tort litigation. Vindication of rights by tort law is thus not the affirmation of
abstract rights or the determination of the boundaries of tort liability. Rather,
‘vindication’ consists in a finding that a particular individual’s rights have been violated
and the recognition that on certain occasions such a finding is of general public
significance. If this is correct, what is significant about Ashley is the willingness of the
courts to use the machinery of a ‘private’ law trial for the sake of examining a matter of
public concern.
Perhaps the clearest statement of this view is found in Arden LJ’s judgment in the
Court of Appeal:

The public has high expectations of the police. Like everyone else, the police are subject to the
rule of law. Those suspected of criminal activity are entitled to the protection of the law. What the
claimants seek in these proceedings is an explanation and redress in a court of law in respect of the

fatal wounding of James Ashley and its subsequent disclosure to the public.53

In this passage Arden LJ focuses on the public interest in knowing what brought about
Ashley’s death and the importance of guaranteeing that the police comply with the rule of
law. There are indications that this is what troubled some of the other judges hearing the
case as well. First, the police admitted negligence in this case all too quickly. After all, if the
facts had been as assumed by the court, the police should have stood a good chance of
answering a claim not just in trespass, but in negligence as well. If PC Sherwood’s
mistake was reasonable in the circumstances, then it is at least arguable that he was not
negligent and that the claim should have been dismissed altogether. Exactly the same
considerations that the judges rely on to conclude that there was no trespass to the person in
this case (in particular the fact that the decision was made in the spur of the moment and in
highly pressing circumstances) can be found in negligence decisions explaining why the
defendant did not breach his duty of care.54 Why then were the police so quick to admit
their negligence in this case? One possibility suggested by the quote above is that the judges
suspected that the facts were not exactly as the police claimed them to be. In the Court of
Appeal Clarke MR mentioned forensic evidence and some conflicting accounts given
by other people at the scene which suggested that the police’s version of the events was
inaccurate;55 he

also

mentioned

evidence

regarding Sherwood’s

problematic

disciplinary record, which at one point even led to a temporary suspension of his firearms
authorisation.56
Alternatively, the negligence was not at the point of execution but rather at the
planning stage,57 but even in that case it may be in the public interest to know whether
there were additional violations of police regulations by PC Sherwood. Either way, it

appears that an important reason for the courts’ decision to allow the trespass claim to go
to trial was the need to make the police more accountable to the public for their
actions. Sensing that the inquiries into the events that led to Ashley’s death had not been
properly conducted but unable to order a public inquiry, some of the judges in both the
House of Lords and the Court of Appeal adopted the closest possible alternative to it:
they allowed the claim in trespass to go to trial and hinted that they would want to see a
more vigorous investigation into what actually happened the night Ashley died.58 Thus, this
approach is consistent with the vague idea of vindication of rights, and yet (and
seemingly paradoxically) it seems to undermine the particular view of tort law usually
associated with it. In this sense vindication is quite limited, because the number of cases in
which it would be invoked is rather small (in contrast with the private law versions of the
vindication argument, in which each tort case, implicitly at least, vindicates rights), but in
those cases vindication is of real, practical significance.
This conclusion is important in several respects. Most narrowly, for the sake of
understanding the outcome of the case it is worth noting that the different views on this
matter were not drawn along the majority-dissent lines. In the Court of Appeal it looks as
though the individualistic, private law view prevailed: it was endorsed both by Clarke MR
writing for the majority59 and by Auld LJ, who explicitly stated that ‘[t]he claim in battery
is a private law claim, the only proper function of which is to provide a private law
remedy’.60 In the House of Lords, however, the public law view suggested here seems to
have had the support of at least two (and perhaps three) members of the panel, with the
views of another (Lord Bingham) not entirely clear on the matter.61 (Only Lord Carswell
clearly rejected this view.62) Lord Scott seemed to approve of the claimants’ desire ‘to
obtain a public admission or finding that the deceased … was unlawfully killed by PC

Sherwood. They want a finding of liability on their assault and battery claim in order to
obtain public vindication of the deceased’s right not to have been subjected to a deadly
assault …’63 Lord Rodger approved of claimants pursuing tort law claims to the end in
order to ‘try out another novel, and more doubtful cause of action, … [or] in order to try to
establish a point of law which would help others in a similar plight’.64 And interestingly, the
clearest support for this view in the House of Lords can be found in Lord Neuberger’s
dissent, in which he stated: ‘I accept … that there is a point in seeking a declaration …
because it is reasonable for Mr Ashley’s estate to wish to establish that his death was
unlawfully caused and because there is a public interest element in proceeding.’65
But more than head counting, if this reading of the decisions is correct, then it may
be that the most important aspect of Ashley is not any of the technical issues that took up
most of its pages. The question of mistaken self-defence and the burden of proof in such
cases are matters of relatively little practical significance because they arise very rarely (as
evidenced by the paucity of cases dealing with these issues). Rather, Ashley is important
because it shows the willingness of at least some of the judges in the Court of Appeal and
the House of Lords to consciously introduce public considerations into tort law. To put
matters more controversially, some of the judges may have used expressions like
‘vindication of rights’ which are associated with a private law conception of tort law to
reach a ‘public law’ result that broadened judicial inspection of government action.
The significance of the decision lies in its particular understanding of the idea of
oversight. Using tort law as a tool for guaranteeing governmental accountability is a
relatively novel, but by now not unheard of, idea.66 In this way tort law may perhaps
already be given a role that goes beyond its traditional scope, but it is one that can be
accommodated within the Diceyan conception of the rule of law. What is important about

the approach of Arden LJ, Lord Rodger and Lord Neuberger is their willingness to
consider the interests of the general public, that is, people who were not directly harmed in
the incident and who are not represented in the litigation in the context of a tort claim. This
willingness on the part of some of the judges to blur the boundaries between private and
public law and to give the intentional torts a more public role may also help in
understanding the recent resurgence of the ‘newly evolving tort’67 of misfeasance in
public office, also considered in Ashley. Originally concerned with voting rights,
misfeasance in public office is an intentional tort exclusively concerned with harms
resulting from abuses of power by public authorities. This tort lay dormant and little used for
many decades,68 and its new lease of life may reflect an understanding of a greater need
for stronger legal means of controlling government action, and a growing awareness
on the part of the judges of the potential for using tort law for this purpose.69
Looking to the future, Ashley raises three questions:70 the first is whether it will be
necessary to rely on the intentional torts for this public role in the future. Could courts in
future cases not add this role to the versatile and flexible tort of negligence? Is there
anything that gives the intentional torts any advantage over negligence in this context?
Admittedly, the reading of Ashley suggested here is consistent with a broader public law
role for all of tort law, and so if future courts decide to adopt a similar approach, they
might not confine it only to the intentional torts. It may be that even in Ashley the public
role given to battery was merely a pragmatic solution to the unique facts of the case.
Perhaps it was battery and not negligence on which the ‘burden’ of public inquiry had
been laid only because of the unusual way in which both parties decided to plead their
case.
Even if that is the case, however, the decisions in Ashley are not insignificant: the

police clearly knew that they could end the matter and avoid judicial inquiry into the
events that led to Ashley’s death by admitting that their actions amounted to battery, and yet
they chose not to do so. In this regard the significant point is not whether other torts could
have been (and in the future, might be) used for the same purpose. The point is that the court
was willing to use tort law, and specifically the intentional torts, for public purposes.
The second, related, question is how likely it is that the intentional torts would be
used for a similar purpose in the future. In part the answer to this question depends on the
behaviour of defendant public authorities in future cases. Having learnt their lesson, they
might prefer to swallow their pride and admit to battery if only to avoid a potentially more
damaging public inquiry in court. On the other hand, it may be that the otherwise
unimportant linguistic point about the difference between negligence and intention
would prove significant in this context, as public authorities might prefer to have a long
inquiry which they might survive relatively intact to a damaging admission of the
‘intentional’ violation of an individual’s rights.
Apart from public authorities’ reaction to Ashley, it remains to be seen how many
future courts will be willing to look behind the questions that appear on the surface of
Ashley and read it in the way suggested here. Indeed, it may be that the matter was
discussed in such vague terms exactly in order to guarantee that the decision in Ashley
remains ‘a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only’.71 Moreover, even if
some of the judges do wish to expand this approach to courts’ inspection of
governmental bodies, it may be that Arden LJ’s discussion at the end of her judgment on the
effect of European law on future cases72 indicates that there will not be much need in the
future for the particular technique chosen in Ashley to guarantee oversight of government
action, as it may be easier and more natural for the courts to rely on the European

Convention on Human Rights for this purpose.73 On the other hand, it may be that some
judges, who may be reticent about the importation of European ideas into English law,74
will find this home-grown development more appealing. In any case, here too, the issue is
not so much whether future courts will follow Ashley as precedent. What matters more is
what this case reveals about the attitude of some of the judges regarding the foundations of
tort law, judges whose view is clearly different from what we are told by many
commentators is the correct way of understanding (English) tort law. Only a few years
before Ashley was decided, the House of Lords, relying on European jurisprudence,
emphasised the importance of conducting a public investigation into the unlawful death of
a prisoner at the hands of another prisoner in the context of a judicial review, ‘public’ law
case.75 In Ashley, ignoring the public-private divide, it allowed the use of English tort law for
the same purpose. The decision thus both emphasises within tort law the deterrent role of
tort law over its more private, compensatory role; but it can also be seen as part of a
broader attempt by the judiciary to strengthen constitutional values such as governmental
transparency and accountability, rule of law, and checks and balances. Since some have
questioned the capacity of monetary remedies to have an effect on government,76 the
approach adopted in Ashley may prove particularly fruitful.
The third question is whether the broader development which I have argued is
reflected in Ashley is desirable and whether it is likely to be effective. Here the traditional
divisions of law may lead some to the conclusion that such inspections of governmental
behaviour should not be conducted as part of a tort case, because the purpose of tort law is
only to deal with the compensation claims of private individuals as a result of individual
wrongdoing.77 Put this way, this objection strikes me as very weak. The scope and aims of
tort law do not come to us from heaven as commandments to obey, and whatever roles tort

law currently fulfils should be maintained only to the extent that they serve a purpose. There
may be very good reason to distinguish between the private and the public: after all, most
people behave differently in private and in public and it is entirely plausible that the law
should reflect this distinction in some way. But as the boundaries between private and public
life have shifted in the last few decades (due to, among other things, the rise of the welfare
state as well as technological changes), it is only natural that the boundaries between private
and public law will shift as well. If what has traditionally been classified as public law proves
insufficient for inspecting public bodies, courts should not let formal boundaries stand in the
way.78
However, the objection may be put more forcefully. It may be argued that because
historically tort law was conceived as concerned only with private disputes, its substantive
rules, as well as the procedural rules of civil proceedings, have developed in such a way that
tort law cannot adequately fulfil this new role assigned to it: the judge might not have the
experience or expertise necessary to deal with such questions, adversarial proceedings
might be thought inferior to a more inquisitorial process needed to deal with such
questions, the judge and parties will be operating under certain time or financial
constraints that will hamper careful examination of the relevant issues, the concerns of
certain relevant parties may not be adequately represented, and so on. This is potentially a
formidable challenge, and it is certainly possible that on certain occasions the objection
could prove decisive against using tort law for the purposes envisaged here. I do not think,
however, that it calls for an outright rejection of the approach presented in this essay.
First, there is a long if convoluted history of dealing with public law matters in what are
formally private law disputes, so there is no a priori reason to think that judges are
incapable of dealing with such matters in the context of private law disputes; second,

procedural and evidentiary rules of civil proceedings have undergone considerable change in
recent years, making claims about the impossibility of adequately handling such claims
within the confines of a private law dispute seem less persuasive. The more active role
given to judges with the advent of case management gives them a greater ability to turn
the parties to the issues and evidence they consider important for the resolution of the
case.79 Finally, while considerations based on the path-dependent development of the law
have their force, they cannot forever block a change in course, if one is needed. If one
believes that these rules stand in the way of an otherwise valuable goal, they should be
changed.
At the same time, it is clear that the solution found in this case is a makeshift tool, and as
such it has its limitations. Not all cases can be brought within the remit of intentional torts,
and as we have seen, ultimately the decision as to whether a judicial inquiry will be
conducted is in the hands of the defendant. If the police had admitted to battery in
Ashley’s case, there would have been no trial, and thus no opportunity for judicial
investigation. Anyone concerned about the adequacy of existing mechanisms for
inspecting public authorities (and police activity in particular) would surely prefer to see a
more comprehensive and direct treatment of this problem.
This leads to another, related, challenge, namely that there is no reason to think that
such judgments are going to be an effective means of inspecting governmental action.
There is a familiar view, with considerable academic support in the UK, that questions the
wisdom of relying on courts to provide an effective check on the excesses of the
executive.80 Those holding this view would surely doubt that the occasional tort claim
could have any noticeable impact on the behaviour of the executive. They may be right;
but perhaps, especially when the powers of the executive are constantly expanding while the

capacity of the legislature to adequately control it is in decline,81 and when because of the
sheer size and complexity of their operations effective control of public authorities is
increasingly difficult, what is required is a willingness to consider new means of
supervising public authorities.

CONCLUSION

Looked at from a narrow perspective, Ashley is an unusual case. Judges ordinarily try to
avoid deciding on matters that have no effect on the outcome of the case. Their reasons for
doing so are easy to understand and for the most part entirely justified. There is no point
spending time and effort on deciding ‘academic’ questions when time and money are
limited and there are so many other cases awaiting resolution. The case is also
interesting because it goes against recent trends that have tended to be quite restrictive
with regard to tort liability of public authorities. (Even though most of these decisions
involved liability for negligence, many of the policy considerations relied upon against the
imposition of liability are applicable to other torts as well.) Why, then, did the majorities in
the Court of Appeal and House of Lords agree to let the question of whether James
Ashley’s person had been trespassed go to trial?
This puzzle calls for explanation. In this article I have considered several
‘individualistic’ readings of the intentional torts. Some, like the view that the intentional
torts should be limited to acts done with intention, focus mostly on individual injurers;
others, like the view that the intentional torts should be concerned with vindication of

rights (in its traditional understanding), focus on individual victims. I have argued that
if we try to limit the ruling in Ashley to these interpretations, then the decisions of both
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords are difficult to defend.
Instead I suggested that we should look beyond the parties involved in the case; then a
different picture emerges. On this picture the tort of trespass to the person was allowed to go
to trial for the sake of making public authorities accountable for their actions. Lord Mustill
once indicated that in order to ‘avoid a vacuum in which the citizen would be left without
protection against a misuse of executive powers the courts have had no option but to
occupy the dead ground in a manner, and in areas of public life, which could not have been
foreseen 30 years ago’.82 If my analysis is correct, Ashley is most convincing as reflecting a
similar attitude. Over the years English courts have often been accused of tending to be
overly deferential and uncritical towards public authorities and particularly the police,83 and
recent examples show that this attitude may not simply be a thing of the past.84 This attitude
might have been justified had public trust in the police been high, but revelations of police
impropriety that was later covered up led one newspaper to report that ‘[t]he incident
undermines confidence in the accountability at the police department’.85 Rather than
concerns over an excessively defensive police force as a result of the imposition of liability,
such incidents indicate that there are reasons to be concerned about an overly aggressive
police force, and that part of the problem may be insufficient judicial oversight.86 Some of
the opinions in the Ashley decisions reflect a recognition of these problems and a
willingness to develop new methods of dealing with the vacuum that has allowed such events
to happen.
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